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RECENT CASES
ACTIONS-ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-PENDENCY OF A REPRESENTATIVE
SUIT BROUGHT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CORPORATION BY ONE SHAREHOLDER
AS A BAR TO A SIMILAR ACTION BY ANOTHER-Plaintiff shareholders instituted,
for the benefit of the corporation, and on behalf of themselves and other like
shareholders, an action to recover corporate funds improperly dissipated by the
defendant directors. Defendants pleaded the pendency of a similar suit by an-
other shareholder, contending that the Rules of Civil Procedure' required the
dismissal of the present action. Held, that the prior pending action did not entitle
defendants to a dismissal as of right, but upon proper motion, the two suits might
be consolidated. Dresdner v. Goldinan Sachs Trading Corp., 269 N. Y. Supp.
360 (App. Div. 1934).
In a suit to recover corporate funds wrongfully expended by directors, the
power of instituting proceedings lies primarily in the corporation and its officers,2
and only when they have neglected or refused to bring the action does the share-
holder acquire a right to sue.3 Furthermore, any recovery obtained as a result
of the shareholder's suit inures to the benefit of the corporation and not to the
shareholder personally.4 It would seem, therefore, that the real party in interest
is the corporation itself 5 and that the rule of lis pendens should preclude another
shareholder's suit.' The court, however, refused to apply the rule, feeling that
the shareholders in the second suit might not be fully and satisfactorily protected.
7
But adequate protection would be afforded by permitting such shareholders to
intervene." If this were done, the original party could not dismiss or settle the
the defendant may serve notice of motion for judgment dismissing the com-
plaint . . . on facts tending to show . . . that there is another action pending between
the same parties ,for the same cause." N. Y. RuLES OF Civnm P.ACrIcE (Cahill, 1531)
§ 107 (4).
- N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAw (1909) §§ 6o (2), 61. See 13 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm.
ed. 1932) § 5954.
'Ibid.; BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (927) 613; 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th
ed. 1923) 3206. Although it is generally said that a prerequisite to the shareholder's suit is a
demand upon the corporation to enforce the right and its refusal, such requirement is unneces-
sary where the corporation is in control of the defendants. Alabama Fidelity Mtge. & Bond
Co. v. Dubberly, ig8 Ala. 545, 73 So. 911 (1917); Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa.
510, IO3 Atl. 340 (1918) ; 4 CooK, op. cit. supra, § 741.
" 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 6028; Dawkins v. Mitchell, 148 La. lO38, 90 So.
396 (1922) ; see Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 242, 195 Pac. 29, 30 (921).
See Lowenstein v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 383, 385, 88 N. Y.
Supp. 313, 315 (19o4). BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 186; 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 5953.
'The principal case is the first to raise squarely the problem here involved. There have
been dicta to the effect that a pending shareholder's suit would bar a subsequent suit. See
Goodbody v. Delaney, 8o N. J. Eq. 417, 419, 83 Atl. 988, 989 (1912) ; 13 FLETCHER, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 5860. But see Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 194, I N. E. 663, 668
(1885). Where suit is brought by a creditor of the corporation, on behalf of himself and
other like creditors, to recover a judgment for creditors as a whole, it has been held that the
pendency of this suit is no bar to another creditor's representative suit, on the theory that as
each member of the group has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation
which is substantially different from that of all other members, the plaintiffs in the two suits
are different parties. Hall v. Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co., 3O4 Ala. 577, 16 So.
439 (1894) ; Sweeney Mfg. Co. v. Goldberg, 66 Ill. App. 568 (1896) ; Innes v. Lansing, 7
Paige 583 (N. Y. 1839).
I The court felt that the shareholder first in the field might not know all the facts, might
lack funds, or be in collusion with the defendants. Principal case at 366 et seq.
1 Intervention is generally a matter of discretion with the court. Principal case at 365.
Since the court felt that the remaining shareholders were not adequately protected, interven-
tion would of course be permitted.
(862)
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action without the consent of the intervenor.' and, should the former be lax in
prosecution, the court would place the intervenor in active charge.' 0 Furthermore,
should separate suits be permitted, a judgment obtained in one would necessitate
the dismissal of the other." The result would be that the shareholders bringing
the second action would be harmed rather than aided by the refusal to uphold the
defendant's contention, since their complaint would be discharged without their
having been afforded at least the opportunity of overseeing the prosecution, as
would have been their privilege had they intervened. Also, when it is remembered
that the purpose of the procedural rule is to prevent the needless institution of
suits likely to be abated in the course of litigation, it seems clear that the real party
in interest should have been held to be the corporation and the plea sustained.
1 2
CONFLICT OF LAws-CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRESENCE OF THE INSURED
INTEREST WITHIN ITS TERRITORY AS GIVING POWER TO A FORUM To APPLY
ITS LAW TO A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE MADE ELSEWHERE-By a contract
entered into in Tennessee, the defendant insured the plaintiff against the de-
falcations of H, "in any position, anywhere". A condition precedent to defend-
ant's liability was that the claim be made within fifteen months of the termina-
tion of the contract. Subsequently, H, who was employed in plaintiff's Tennessee
office, left it and continued as plaintiff's treasurer in Mississippi, where he
embezzled certain of plaintiff's monies. Eighteen months after the contract
was terminated, these thefts were discovered and claim duly made. One Mis-
sissippi statute ' declares "all contracts of insurance on property, lives or interests
in this state shall be deemed to be made therein". Another declares null and
void all stipulations in contracts attempting to change the period of limitation.2
and the fifteen month clause in the instant contract would be interpreted as
such a limitation of action.3 By Tennessee law this clause is a condition limiting
liability and valid.4 Plaintiff sued defendant in Mississippi within its statutory
period and the supreme court of that state held that "the conflict of law between
the two states is eliminated",0 and the Mississippi contract law was applied.
Held, that the statute so construed deprived defendant of due process of law.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 54 Sup. Ct.
634 (1934).
Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a state to impose on an individual
legal incidents which will be recognized by another state.' Such jurisdiction
'fBelmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1891);
Parten v. Southern Colonization Co., 146 Minn. 287, 178 N. W. 744 (1g2o).
10 Manning v. Mercantile Trust Co., 37 Misc. 215, 75 N. Y. Supp. 168 (i9o2).
"Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; Willoughby v. Chicago Junction
Railways, 5o N. J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 277 (1892) ; Hearst v. Putnam Mining Co., 28 Utah 184,
77 Pac. 753 (19o4) ; 13 FLrcHmE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 6043; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 633.
" If the defendants were in collusion with the shareholders first instituting proceedings,
as the court seemed to fear, the defendants would not move for consolidation, but would
hasten the adjudication of the first case and permit the plaintiff to obtain a judgment for
nominal damages. This would effectively bar the present plaintiffs from further action.
IMiss. CoDE ANN. (1930) § 5131. The same section defines contracts of insurance in
such manner as to include the one in the instant case.2 Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 2294.
'Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Miller, 125 Miss. 502, 87 So. 892 (92).
'See City of Bristol v. Bostwick, 146 Tenn. 205, 240 S. W. 774 (92).
H artford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 15o So. 205 (933).6 Cf. CoNmrICT OF LAws RESTATrMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1934) Proposed Final Draft No. 4
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may be based exclusively upon citizenship (only in the case of a nation), domicil,
consent, personal presence within the territorial limits, or the doing of acts or
causing of consequences therein.! In each situation jurisdiction must exist at
the time the act sought to be governed is done.' If a state which has no legis-
lative jurisdiction attempts to create rights and liabilities by its own law, and
in accordance therewith, having judicial jurisdiction,9 to impose a judgment on
a person, such judgment will not be recognized in other states under the prin-
ciples of Conflict of Laws. In the United States such a judgment of itself
violates due process. 10 In the instant case the contract of insurance having
been made in Tennessee, that state had legislative jurisdiction to regulate the
terms of the contract,"1 and the presence of the insured interest within Mis-
sissippi does not seem a sufficient basis for legislative jurisdiction, nor does it
seem so connected with the contract as to make advisable the application of
Mississippi law by Tennessee.12 The Supreme Court refused to apply the
much attacked "place of performance" doctrine 18 to this case on the grounds
that at most it could involve only a "casual" payment in Mississippi. Nor could
Mississippi law be applied on the ground that the problem is purely procedural,
since the right of action never accrued by the law of the place governing the
substance, i. e., Tennessee, and to allow suit would not be mere procedure since
it would of necessity enlarge the obligation. The instant case has made a
significant addition to the growing line of cases holding that a violation of
conflict of laws principles is a deprivation of due process.14
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL POWER OVER INTERSTATE COMMERCE-
PRICE FIXING BY CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE CLEANING AND DYEING
INDUSTRY-Defendant's stores in New York City accepted for cleaning and dye-
ing materials which were then sent by truck to New Jersey where they were
processed by an affiliated company.' When prosecuted by the federal government
for charging the public a lower rate for the service than that required by the
'Id. § 67; see §48.
8Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
'Judicial jurisdiction is merely the jurisdiction of a court based on personal service
within the territory, appearance, etc. See CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1934) Proposed Final Draft No. 4 § 82.
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879 (1914) ; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129 (1924) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S.
397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338 (1930).
' Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207 (1895) ; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389,20 Sup. Ct. 962 (19oo).
' An example of a connection with a state so strong that a state with legislative juris-
diction will apply the former's law is the application of the law of the state of a deceased's
domicil by a state having jurisdiction of the deceased's chattels. Ennis v. Smith, 55 U. S. 400
(1852).
"3 The doctrine is not favored by legal theorists for many reasons. See Beale, What Law
Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909) 23 HARv. L. REV. I; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1927) § 107.
"See cases cited supra note ii.
Although the facts showed a common ownership qf the stores and the processing plant,
it is submitted that this connection is immaterial. Conceivably, the three operations-con-
tracting with the public, interstate transportation between store and factory and actual process-
ing-might be performed by different companies, and yet this fact would not prevent the
charge to the public for cleaning and dyeing as a competitive practice from reducing the in-
terstate shipments of other groups operating in a similar manner but maintaining the Code
price.
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industry's Code, 2 the defendant contended that its business was neither vested with
a public interest nor a part of interstate commerce. Held, that the defendant was
subject to the price fixing provisions of the Code which were valid regulations of
interstate commerce. United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., N. Y. L. J.,
April 4, 1934, at I (S. D. N. Y).
Although most cleaning and dyeing establishments, because they neither
make use of nor act as an outlet for interstate commerce, would seem to be, as
local services, free from federal control,3 yet a different rule might well apply
when, as in the instant case, an essential part of the business is interstate trans-
portation of the materials to be cleaned. 4 In this situation, the question is whether
the federal government can protect such interstate commerce from destructive
competition by setting up a uniform price for the actual cleaning and dyeing.
While the power of the states to fix prices depends upon the "public interest" in
the business,5 that of the federal government depends ultimately upon how clearly
the record in each case demonstrates the close relationship in fact between the
sustained flow of interstate commerce and the price of the commodity or the local
practices that affect that price.0 Thus the Supreme Court has upheld federal
condemnation of intrastate monopolies seeking to control the price 7 and specula-
tive buying that indirectly caused it to fluctuate," in both instances relying upon
the assumption that the price inherently and directly affects interstate commerce.
As the record in the instant case adequately indicated that price-cutting had been
the chief competitive weapon by which the defendant had reduced the interstate
shipment of materials by other cleaners and dyers, the protection of commerce
from such destructive practice should be well within the federal power.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC UTILITIES-VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL
TAX WHICH DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE ELECTRIC
PLANTs-Seattle operated an electric plant which actively competed with plain-
' Code of Fair Competition for the Cleaning and Dyeing Industry, art. vi, § 3 (h). The
court in the instant case also held that the Code authorities were warranted in not making a
distinction as to price between "cash and carry" cleaners, as was the defendant, and "call
for and deliver" cleaners. Contra: Cleaners and Dyers Board of Trade, Inc. v. Spotless
Dollar Cleaners, Inc., U. S. L. W., Feb. 27, 1934, at 535 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.). Cf. National Re-
covery Release No. 2402, Dec. 20, 1933, C. C. H. INc., FEDmAL TADE REGuLATION SERVIc0
(1933) 39,082, f138,609.03.
'Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. Fla. 1933) ; California v. Economy Cleaners,
Cal. Super. Ct., March 27, 1934, U. S. L. W., April 10, 1934, at 696; Note (934) 82 U. OF
PA. L. REv-. 733. Cf. Hoskins v. Gullatt Cleaning and Laundry Co., U. S. L. W., April 3,
1934, at 683 (Ohio C. P.) ; California v. Capital Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., Cal. Super. Ct.,
Feb. 27, 1934, C. C. H. INC., FEDERAL TRADE REGuLATIoN SEvxcE (934) 5398, ff 7133.
' The legal significance of the fact that many New York cleaners send their materials to
New Jersey is that in order to protect this interstate commerce, the federal government, rely-
ing upon Houston, East and West Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct.
833 (914), might well regulate those intrastate cleaners in New York City within the same
competitive area who, although they do not make use of interstate transportation, can easily
burden or reduce it by fixing lower rates than those which do.
' Nebbia v. New York, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (I934), Note (934) 82 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 61g.
0 Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting Constitutional Validity of
Legislative Action (1924) 38 HARV. L. REv. 6.
"Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922) (regulation of the practices
of packers and commission men because of their effect upon price of meat shipped in inter-
state commerce).
8 Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (I923), in which the
Court, in sustaining federal control of dealing in grain "futures", said, at 40, 43 Sup. Ct. at
478, "The question of price dominates trade between the States. Sales of an article which
affect the country-wide price of an article directly affect the country-wide commerce in it."
That as a matter Of fairness and stability the Court should make important fact con-
clusions only from the legal record seems clear. Bikl6, supra note 6.
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tiff, a privately-owned company. The city imposed a 3 per cent. license tax on
gross revenues derived from the sale of electricity. The ordinance provided
that the tax apply to the city plant "so far as is permitted by law", but an out-
standing bond issue made it highly improbable that the city plant could pay the
tax. Plaintiff sought to recover taxes already paid and to enjoin further en-
forcement of the ordinance, contending that it violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court of Washington dismissed the bill. Held, that
judgment be affirmed; that even assuming that the ordinance did not tax the city
plant, the plaintiff could not complain because the effect of the tax was to
improve the city's competitive position, there being reasonable grounds for
classification and the tax itself being reasonable.' Puget Sound Power & Light
Co. v. City of Seattle, 54 Sup. Ct. 542 (1934).
It is accepted doctrine that where taxpayers are capable of separate classifi-
cation, a state may use its taxing power to confer a competitive advantage on
one at the expense of the other.2  The principal case, going one step further,
allowed the authority which imposed the tax to be itself the beneficiary of the
competitive advantage the tax affords. While the indirect effect of the tax will
be to prevent the plaintiff from actively competing with the municipal plant,
and will thus work a destruction of the plaintiff's business, no valid constitu-
tional objection can be raised. It was admitted that the tax itself was reason-
able; and it is settled that the fact that a municipal plant operates in the public
interest while the private plant serves for private profit justifies a statutory
classification calling for the exemption of the one and the taxing of the other.3
Thus, the general property tax of a municipality does not violate the constitu-
tional requirement of equal protection of the laws where imposed on private
plants but not on municipal plants.4  Nor can the due process argument be
invoked against the tax in question, since a municipality retains its right to
compete and tax when it grants a franchise to a private company.' The reason-
able exercise of the taxing power is not made unreasonable merely because its
indirect effect is to foster, at the expense of the taxpayer, a competitive activity
which the taxing authority is lawfully promoting.6  Moreover, the motive for
'Mr. Justice Van Devanter, with whom were Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and But-
ler, specially concurred and was of the opinion that the ordinance effectively taxed the city
plant, and that, therefore, there was no discrimination against the plaintiff. He reasoned that
if the bond provision required only the sequestration of net income, the city would be com-
pelled to pay the tax; but that even if it required sequestration of gross income and the city
could not pay the tax, plaintiff could not object inasmuch as the city could not be forced to
impair its obligation under the bonds.
' State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (931) (grad-
uated license tax on chain stores) ; cf. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933),
(1933) 8I U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 871. See Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 52 F. (2d) 5,5 (D.
S. C. i93i), aff'd, 288 U. S. 178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326 (933), where a statute was held valid
which taxed production of electricity by water power, but exempted from tax electricity pro-
duced by oil or internal combustion engines.
' See Broad River Power Co. v. Query, supra note 2, at 52o; South Carolina Power Co.
v. Tax Commission, 52 F. (2d) 515 (D. S. C. 1931).
'Madera Waterworks Co. v. City of Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 571 (1913) ; 2
COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 644; 2 POND, PUBLIC UTruLTIES (4th ed. 2932) § 400 ff.;
Note (1934) 34 Coi. L. RE v. 324, 331.
'Joplin v. Light Co., 191 U. S. 150, 24 Sup. Ct. 43 (1903) ; Madera Waterworks Co. v.
City of Madera, sitpra note 4; Mississippi Power Co. v. City of Starkville, 4 F. Supp. 833
(D. Miss. 1932) ; State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry., 75 Mo. 208 (188) ; City of Portland v.
Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 8o Ore. 271, i56 Pac. O58 (1916) ; 2 POND, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 424.
See Springfield G. & E. Co. v. City of Springfield, 257 U. S. 66, 42 Sup. Ct. 24 (1921),
where the Court upheld a state statute permitting a city to fix its own electric rates and re-
quiring a competing private company to be regulated by commission. Mr. Justice Holmes said,
"The conduct of which the plaintiff complains is not extortion but, on the contrary, charging
rates that draw the plaintiff's customers away.:' 257 U. S. at 70, 42 Sup. Ct. at 25.
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the imposition of a reasonable tax cannot give rise to constitutional objection.7
The plight of the private company, in the situation which the principal case
presents, is augmented by the fact that a rate increase to absorb the tax is im-
practicable competitively; and equalization of municipal and private rates is
precluded, inasmuch as the state utility commission has no jurisdiction over the
municipal plant." Apparently, the only course open to the private company is
active opposition of its security holders to the imposition of the tax.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE OFFICES-POWER OF COURT To DECLARE
VACANCY IN STATE SENATE AND TO ORDER ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF ELECTION-
M, K and W, members of the Delaware Senate, were appointed to, and had
accepted, other state offices. The state constitution provides that: "No . . .
person holding any office under this State, . . shall during his continuance
. . . in office be a Senator or Representative; . . ."I The relator sought
a writ of mandamus to compel the Lieutenant-Governor, as presiding officer of
the Senate, to issue writs of election 2 for the seats of M, K and W on the
ground that acceptance of the second offices was an automatic resignation from
the Senate. The Senate, however, had adopted resolutions declaring that no
vacancies existed in the contested seats. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction
to grant the prayer, since under the constitution each house of the legislature
was sole judge of the qualifications of its own members.3 State ex rel. Biggs
v. Corley, Delaware Court in Banc, April 3, 1934.
At common law, the acceptance of an incompatible office under the govern-
ment by one holding another office effected a resignation of the first.4 This
principle has been embodied in the constitutions of this country by the pro-
visions forbidding dual office holding by members of the legislative body.5
Courts have willingly enforced these prohibitions when the office contested is
not that of legislator; but in the latter situation, they have consistently refused
to act, on the theory that the constitutions required the interpretation that each
house of the legislature was sole arbiter of the qualifications of its members.8
In the instant case, the court reasserted the necessity for preserving the inde-
pendence of the Senate, by allowing it to determine vacancies for itself, but by
this decision seemed to overlook the interests of the people, for whose protec-
tion the constitution was drafted. The constitution is an instrument whereby
the electorate designates the powers it is willing to give up to the governmental
"Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 703 (1885) ; Kansas City v. Brown,
286 Mo. I, 227 S. W. 89 (1920).8WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § lO39O.
I DEL. CoNsT., art. ii, § 14.
2 Id. §6.
3Id. § 8.
'State ex rel. Metcalf v. Goff, 15 R. I. 505, 9 Atl. 226 (1887) ; Rex v. Tizzard, 9 B. &
C. 413 (1829); Rex v. Jones, I B. & Ad. 677 (1831); MECHEM, PUBLC OFFICES AND
OFFICERS (18go) §42o.
I E. g., U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, Sec. 6, cl. :2; N. J. CONsT., art iv, § 5; N. Y. CoNsT., art.
iii, §§ 7, 8; OHIO CONsT., art. ii, § I9; PA. CoNsT., art. ii, § 6. It is to be noted that slight
variations in the language of the different constitutions raise different problems under appar-
ently the same set of facts. Some deal with appointment to office, others provide for holding
office. Some merely forbid dual holding, while others declare that in such case a vacancy
exists.0 State ex rel. Martin v. Gilmore, 20 Kan. 551 (1878) ; Covington v. Buffett, 9o Md. 569,
45 Ati. 204 (1900) ; People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865) ; cf. Scott v.
Strobach, 49 Ala. 477 (1873) ; Greenwood v. Registrars of Fitchburg, 282 Mass. 74, 184 N.
E. 390 (1933) ; State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N. W. 604 (927);
State ex rel. Leland v. Mason, 61 Ohio St. 513, 56 N. E. 468 (19oo).
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departments. Certain restrictions are placed on each department so that none
can become tyrannical as a result of unbridled strength. For this reason, the
chief executive is given a veto upon legislation; the Senate must consent to
appointments; and a person holding any other state office is barred from occupy-
ing a seat in the legislature.7 Just as the courts have taken upon themselves the
function of declaring that statutes passed by the legislature are unconstitutional,
they can find themselves endowed with the power of declaring that the retention
of seats by Senators holding other state offices is unconstitutional, especially
since an express provision may be pointed to as authority. s This will not con-
flict with the clause giving each house the power to judge the qualifications of
its own members, since an adequate interpretation of that provision would be
that no one may be forced upon either house without having shown to its satis-
faction that he is acceptable. Thereby the main purpose of the clause would be
achieved, namely. permitting the legislature to maintain the standard of its
membership by giving it the ultimate power to exclude. But to hold that the
Senate can be sole judge of qualifications in all cases, would allow that body to
admit or to retain anyone at all, since from the tenor of the instant decision no
one can call the legislature to task for openly refusing to obey the express
mandate of the constitution.
CORPORATIONS-CORPORATE ENTITY-INSOLVENCY AS A REQUISITE TO
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL BETwEEN PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORA-
TIONS-Railroad A organized railroad B to build lines which A had no power to
build. A owned all the stock in B, the directors and executive officers were the
same, and all of B's activities were controlled by A.1 X had a contract claim
against B and, upon failure of B to pay, sued A. Judgment was given for A on
the ground that A and B were separate legal entities.2 Upon B's bankruptcy the
claim of A (for advances to B) and that of X having been allowed, X claimed
that A was not entitled to share equally with other creditors because of the rela-
tionship between A and B. Held, that the judgment in favor of A against X
on the contract did not bar X from asserting priority over A in the assets of B,
and that X was entitled to such priority. Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F. (2d)
460 (C. C. A. zst, 1933).
Where corporations, though in form distinct, are in management and control
so closely identified as to constitute a single business unit,' courts have increasingly
shown a willingness in some situations to disregard the separate "entities" and to
permit legal consequences which would obtain were the entire business unit a
'For a discussion of separation and interrelation of governmental departments see Note
(1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 739, 744 ef seq. and references there collected.
' Supra note I. The result of constitutional interpretation by the courts has inclined
some writers to the view that the document is merely a starting point around which the real
constitution has grown. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 CoT. L.
REV. I.
'There was no record of separate resolutions or business transactions by B, but merely
entries on B's books which were made when any money was spent or borrowed and which
corresponded to similar entries on the books of A. No meetings of B were held except for
the purpose of filling vacancies in the board of directors, as required by statute.
- Marsch v. Southern New England R. Corp., 230 Mass. 483, 12o N. E. 12o (1918).
'Analogous to the problem in relation to affiliated corporations is the piercing of the
corporate veil in "one man corporation" cases where similar considerations prevail. See
BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (927) 32; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 8o8.
RECENT CASES
single legal entity.' Such situations frequently arise where a parent corporation
so completely dominates its subsidiary that there is a virtual assimilation of the
latter, it becoming a mere "instrumentality" of the parent.5 It has been held that
a dominating parent corporation is liable for the tort obligations of a subsidiary,0
or on the contracts of an insolvent subsidiary 7 and that a parent corporation can-
not maintain a claim against an insolvent subsidiary where rights of other cred-
itors would be adversely affected thereby.s The instant court was convinced that
there was complete identification 1 of activity and control between A and B, and
that it would be an unjust deprivation of X's rights to permit A, in competition
with X, to prove a claim against what was, realistically, itself under a different
title. The court was faced, however, with the further contention that the former
holding, during B's solvency, of A's non-liability on the contract between B and
X was res adjudicata 10 and required extending to A equality with X. This it
properly met by deciding that the issue of the existence of vicarious contract
liability during solvency was not identical with that of the right to claim as a
creditor after bankruptcy of the "instrumentality" subsidiary."- During solvency
' WORmSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY AND ALLrFn CORPORATE3 PROB-
LEms (1927) I, 1n; BALLANTINE, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 33; I FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 43; Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity
Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 128.
' Mere ownership by the parent of all the stock of the subsidiary and identity of officers
is not enough to constitute the subsidiary an "instrumentality" of the parent corporation.
Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 72o (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). There must be addi-
tional facts showing actual domination of the management and activity of the subsidiary. As
to the factual criteria from which the existence of an instrumentality relationship may be
determined, see PoWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1931) 9; WORMSER, 10c.
cit. supra note 4; Douglas and Shanks, Insulatiom From Liability Through Subsidiary Cor-
porations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12.
'The Willem Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); Costan v. Manilla Elec-
tric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (.C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; see Douglas and Shanks, supra note 5, at 195
et seq. Such liability has been imposed on parent railroad corporations even though the sub-
sidiary was solvent. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o6);
cf. Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34 (1925).
' Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 192o) ; Ports-
mouth Cotton Oil Mfg. Co. v. Fourth National Bank, 28o Fed. 879 (N. D. Ala. 1922); see
Douglas and Shanks, supra note 5, at 210 et seq.; Note (933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 823. No
cases have been found which impose vicarious contract liability where neither corporation is
insolvent.
8'n re Marcella Cotton Mills, 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o9) ; Clere Clothing Co. v.
Union Trust and Savings Bank, 244 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) ; S. G. V. Co. of Del. v. S.
G. V. Co. of Pa., 264 Pa. 265, lO7 Atl. 721 (1919) (cases in which advances by parent to sub-
sidiary were held to have the status of capital invested, not loans) ; cf. Edward Finch Co. v.
Robie, 12 F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (claims made against estate of bankrupt indi-
vidual by two corporations which he had organized and operated as mere instrumentalities
rejected).
Although the performance by B of a function which A did not in its then form have
the power to carry out was a factor pointing away from identification, Corsicana Nat. Bank
v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 68, 4o Sup. Ct. 82 (1919) ; Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Federal Elec-
tric Co., 135 Misc. 113, 236 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1929), all the other facts showed such an ab-
sence of business individuality in B as to make the subordination of A's claim justifiable.
10 The parties to the present suit being privies to those in the first action, the judgment
there is conclusive as to any matter in issue and determined by that suit. Hartford L. Ins.
Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692 (1914) ; Doty v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 71 (1850).
' The District Court attained the result of the instant decision, but reached it on the
ground that under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I (U. S. 1842), the decision of the
earlier case was not binding on it. Central Vermont Ry. v. So. New England R. R., I F.
Supp. 1O4 (D. Mass. 1932). The instant court, however, made no mention of that rule, rest-
ing its holding on the difference between the issues in the litigations.
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of the subsidiary, there is no public policy 2 which demands a restriction of the
power of owners to act through a legal form, a method of doing business fully
sanctioned by society and law. After insolvency, however, sound economic rea-
soning requires that creditors who do not control or directly benefit from the
obligor's activities should not, as against the parent corporation, bear the risks
of a business in which the latter, through its domination of the insolvent obligor
corporation, is in fact engaging. The instant decision is a clear recognition that
the presence of facts threatening economic and social injustice by the use of
formally separate entities is the fundamental basis for any disregard of the cor-
porate form.
CRIMINAL LAw-FoRGERY-CORPORATIONS-CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF SOLE
SHAREHOLDER FOR FORGERY OF CORPORATION CHEcK-Sole shareholder of cor-
poration was indicted for forgery l of its check, signed by its treasurer, by insert-
ing his name as payee and using the proceeds for his own purposes. The court
charged that if the jury found that the defendant's act did not prejudice the cor-
poration's creditors or if he did not intend to defraud them, a verdict of not guilty
must be returned. State v. Staples, Court of General Sessions, Sussex County,
Del., April Term, 1934.
Ownership by a single individual of all of the shares of a corporation has
not, as a general rule, been considered sufficient to vest ownership of the corpora-
tion's property in him so that he may ignore the separate existence of the corpo-
ration and deal with the property as his own without formal action by the corpo-
ration.2 Frequent decisions, however, issuing from a minority of jurisdictions,
have so excised the rule that, unless corporate creditors are injured by the sole
shareholder's use of the corporation's assets, the sole shareholder has the power
to encumber or dispose of corporate property.3 And since, in almost every case,
the sole shareholder completely controls the management of the corporation
through "dummy" directors, his exercise of that power has never subjected him to
an action by the corporation for the waste or unauthorized use of corporate assets
-although theoretically there would seem to be no reason why the corporation
as a separate entity should not be able to prosecute such an action. Where it is
attempted to charge the sole shareholder with a criminal liability for the unauthor-
ized appropriation of the corporation's property, it would seem that he is likewise
immune, at least where a necessary element of the crime for which he is indicted-
e. g., forgery-is either an act prejudicing another's interests or done with an
intent to defraud. Neither can be present-assuming that the depletion of the
' Before insolvency, the creditor's remedy is complete, and he has in no way been injured
by the parent corporation. See PowE=L, op. cit. supra note 5, at 85.
'The indictment was found under DEL. REv. CODE (1915) § 4773, which makes the crime
of forgery a felony. Since the statute is not definitive of the crime, the common law defini-
tion, requiring the making or altering of an instrument to another's prejudice with an intent
to defraud, is still in force. See State v. Anderson, I Boyce 135, 74 Atl. 1097 (Del. i9IO)
Barron v. State, 12 Ga. App. 342, 77 S. E. 214 (r913).
2 A majority of jurisdictions adhere to this view. Coal Belt Elec. Ry. v. Peabody Coal
'Co., 230 Ill. 164, 82 N. E. 627 (i9o7) ; Buffalo Loan, Trust, etc. Co. v. Medina Gas & Elec-
tric Light Co., 162 N. Y. 67, 56 N. E. 505 (i9oo) ; Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252,
34 S. W. 209 (i896); see Watson v. Bonfils, 116 Fed. 157, 167 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o2); i
CooK, CoRPoRATioNs (8th ed. 1923) § 6; 4 id. at § 704.
3First Nat. Bank v. Winchester, ii9 Ala. i68, 24 So. 351 (1898) ; Scales v. Holje, 41
-Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919) ; Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534
(i886) ; Bear Creek Lumber Co. v. Second Nat. Bank of Cumberland, 120 Md. 566, 87 Atl.
-1084 (913) ; see Central Mfg. Co. v. Montgomery, i44 Mo. App. 494, 129 S. W. 460 (igio).
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corporation's assets still leaves funds sufficient to satisfy the claims of its cred-
itors-unless the corporation be regarded as a persona distinct from its sole share-
holder. While disregard for this distinction has been confined in the main to
cases where the corporate form has been used by a sole shareholder as a means
of fraud or evasion, 4 the only reason advanced for its retention where the sole
shareholder disposes of corporation property not in fraud of creditors is "to keep
the title to corporate property free from complication and uncertainty".5 That
this is not a sufficient reason to impose a criminal liability for an act otherwise
without appreciable anti-social effect,6 is clearly recognized by the instant court's
disregard of the corporate entity as a possible subject of the defendant's fraud-
ulent intent or prejudicial act.
7
JUDGMENTS-RES JUDIcATA-LACK OF MUTUALITY IN ESTOPPEL BY
JUDGMENT-Plaintiff brought an action based on an alleged printed offer by
defendant to pay $io,ooo reward "for information leading to the detection of
any dealer substituting Pepsi-Cola for any other five cent drink". Plaintiff
averred that it made known to defendant instances of such substitution by
certain dealers. The conduct of these dealers had been found to be insufficient
basis for the grant of an injunction sought by plaintiff to restrain these alleged
substitutions.' Plaintiff demurred to defendant's plea of res judicata on the
ground that the defendant here was not shown to be in privity with the former
defendants. Held,2 that the plaintiff was bound by the adverse judgment on
the same issues, even though there was no privity between the defendants and
there was a lack of mutuality of estoppel. Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co.,
Del. Super. Ct., April i6, 1934.
As a condition precedent to the application of the rule of res judicata, it is
generally recognized that the benefit of a judgment as an estoppel against an
adversary cannot be claimed unless the party seeking the benefit could have a
contrary decision of the case pleaded as an estoppel against him.2 However,
'Thus the fact that the sole shareholder set fire to the corporation's property was upheld
as a defense in an action by the corporation against the insurance company. Felsenthal v.
Northern Assurance Co., Ltd., 284 Ill. 343, i2o N. E. 268 (igx8). See also Northern Securi-
ties Co. v. United States, I93 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (i9o3) ; United States v. Milwaukee
Ref. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C. C. E. D. Wis. io5) ; WORsER, DIsRExARD OF THE CoR-
PORATE FicrioN AND ALLiED CORPORATE PROBLEmS (927) 84.
'WORMSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8i; Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn.
214, 54 N. W. iii5 (1893).
' It is even doubtful whether transfer by a sole shareholder of corporate; property will
result in the great confusion of title anticipated by WoR sER, loc. cit. supra note 5. ANDER-
sox, LmnrrATioNs OF THE CORPORATE ENY (i93i) § 85. A conceivably harm~ful effect of
such an act by a sole shareholder lies in the possible injury to those who may in the future
become creditors. But this hardly seems a sufficient ground for imposing beforehand the
heavy criminal liability attendant to a felony.
7 Of course, if there be even one share of stock outstanding in the hands of one other
than a mere nominal holder, a criminal as well as civil liability may3 well be imposed. See
Central Mfg. Co. v. Montgomery, supra note 5; Reinecke v. Bailey, 33 Ky. L. R. 977, 112
S. W. 569 (i9o8) ; 4 FLErcHzE, CORPORATIONS (I9I8) § 2506.
'Coca Cola Co. v. Happiness Candy Stores, Inc., ig Del. Ch. 292, 167 Atl. 9oo (933).
The final judgment was for plaintiff, since the defendant's plea purported to answer the
entire declaration, but in fact answered only part. Substitutions by three dealers were alleged
in the declaration and substitutions by only two of these were involved in the former pro-
ceedings in Chancery.
'Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 549, 8 Sup. Ct. 210 (1887) Burton v. Hazzard, 4
Harr. ioo (Del. 1844) ; Fletcher v. Perry, 104 Vt. 229, 158 Atl. 679 (1932).
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an exception to the rule is found in those cases where liability is derivative.4
A judgment in favor of either one of the two possible defendants in such a
case may be pleaded by the other in a second action by the same plaintiff,
although a judgment for the plaintiff cannot be pleaded by him against the
second defendant.' A broad interpretation has been given to the rule of res
judicata in many instances, in order to achieve desirable results, but an extension
of the rule as to mutuality has not been expressly recognized.6 Such an exten-
sion, however, is readily reconciled with the policy which underlies the rule-
the end of litigation 7 -- and has received support from legal writers.8 As a
matter of law, no prejudice arose against the defendant in the principal case as
a result of a judgment for the plaintiff in the first case, but the court realized
that there would be a factual prejudice against the defendant, for if an adequate
cause could be stated in one instance, there was a strong probability that it
would be repeated.9 This reasoning has been answered only by the argument
that a plaintiff may plead his case differently against different defendants.' 0 The
validity of this argument is based only on a lack of democracy in our actual
practice of law and has no foundation in sound public policy, whereas the rule
in the principal case has its roots in a policy that has met with the approval of
tradition and practicability."
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-APPLICA-
TION OF THE RULE OF SEVERABILITY TO A COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-
Plaintiff and defendant, partners, maintaining offices in both Los Angeles and
San Francisco, upon dissolution of their tourist brokerage business "in the state
of California", covenanted that each would do business only in an agreed half
of the state, for a period of twenty-five years. Plaintiff sought to recover
damages for defendant's acceptance of business originating in the former's
territory. A statute provided that all agreements to refrain from doing business
are void,' but that partners, upon dissolution of their business, inay agree to
" Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 158 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 8th,
1907), i6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 677 (I908) ; Note (i934) 29 Ii. L. RE-v. 93.
' The basis of this rule is that no person can be deprived of his property except by due
process of law, and the defendant in the second case would not have received the benefit of
due process. Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 34 Pac. 278 (1893) ; Fisher v. Wineman, 125
Mich. 642, 84 N. W. inin (19O1).
6 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. II1, 32 Sup. Ct. 641 (i912); Burton
v. Hazzard, suepra note 3; Burton v. Masten, i8 Del. Ch. 242, i58 Atl. 136 (i931); see Old
Time Petroleum Co. v. Turcol, i8 Del. Ch. 121, 134, i56 Atl. 5o1, 5o6 (i93i).
72 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 626; see Sklarsky v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co., 47 F. (2d) 662, 665 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
' Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead (1923) 9 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 241; Note
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 607; Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932)
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 386; cf. Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903) (a
judgment is a binding adjudication against the party who obtained it, even though as to the
other party it may be void for lack of jurisdiction).
"Cf. (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 556.
"Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 Yu.s. L. J. 299.
1 The attitude of the court in the principal case is consistent with that of the courts
which have liberalized the rules of evidence to allow a judgment to be introduced as prima
facie evidence against a person who was a party to the suit in which the judgment was ren-
dered, although the one offering the evidence was not a party to that proceeding and there-
fore would be sustained in his objections to the offer of such judgment against him. (1927)
40 HARv. L. REv. 909.
1 CAL. Cwv CODE (Deering, 1923) § 1673.
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refrain from doing business in the city where the partnership business has been
transacted.2 Held, that the covenant was severable and valid to the extent of
the city where the office was located. Edwards v. Mullin, Cal. Sup. Ct. No.
L. A. 14521, U. S. L. W. April 24, 1934, at 8.
It is well settled that where an agreement not to engage in a particular
business is unreasonable as a whole with respect to the nature of the business
sought to be protected, but the language permits a construction that is "sever-
able", it will be enforced within such smaller limits as are reasonable.3 But
where the covenant i "indivisible", this will not normally be done.4 The grow-
ing tendency of courts today, however, is to "strain to put such a construction
upon the covenant so as to save it in part",' and thus give some validity to an
indivisible and otherwise invalid agreementY The effect of such decisions is
the construction of a new covenant by the court to replace the invalid one entered
into by the parties themselves 7 and denotes a growing liberal attitude in validat-
ing covenants restricting competitive business. Even recognizing this trend,
however, the result in the instant case might be justified only when it is noted
that the main reasons advanced for the invalidation of such covenants, namely,
the elimination of existing competition and the deprivation of service to the
community,8 have little persuasive force, inasmuch as the same area hitherto
served will continue to be served, and, since it is divided, with more intensifica-
tion. But, on the other hand, the arbitrary adoption of the city boundary as
the extent to which the covenant will be held valid may be entirely foreign to
the intent of the contracting parties., Moreover, it fails to weigh accurately
the nature of the business, which may be state-wide in character and not re-
stricted to the city in which the office is located.10 With the growth of com-
merce and the annihilation of distances, many business dealings can no longer
be restricted to a city, town, or part thereof.' Finally, it is submitted, such a
policy of judicial construction of contracts, rather than the interpretation of
them, will lead to the imposition of more severe restrictions in the covenants.
The party having the balance of bargaining power in the transaction will en-
deavor to exact as much as is possible, knowing that the court, instead of
invalidating the covenant entirely, will enforce it so far as it might properly
2 Id. § 1675.
'General Paint Corp. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 611, 12 P. (2d) 990 (1932) ; Trenton
Potteries Co. v. Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 AtI. 723 (1889) ; Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. 579,
6 Atl. 251 (1886) ; General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N. W. 469 (1932).
I3 WMrLSTON, CoNTRAcrs (192o) § 1659.
Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. (2d) 112, at 115 (S. D. N. Y. ig3i).
'Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o) ; Davey
Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S. W. (2d) 62 (193o) ; Edgecomb v. Edmon-
ston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926); Whiting Milk Companies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass.
570, 179 N. E. 169 (1931).
'The House of Lords has disapproved, at least in cases involving employment con-
tracts, of any attempts by the courts "to carve out of thisl void covenant the maximum of
what he [the employer] might validly have required". Mason v. Provident Clothing &
Supply Co., [1913] A. C. 724, 745. See also Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind.
560, 41 N. E. 1048 (1895).
s Kales, Ccntracts to Refrain From Doing Business or From Entering or Carrying On
an Occupation (917) 31 HARv. L. Ray. 193.
1Id. at 202, where it is said that "The rational test is the extent of the business sold
and not the boundaries of some political subdivision of the country."
"Moreover, suppose a place of business in many cities scattered throughout the state.
If covenants as to all were enforced, this, in effect, would invalidate a restriction spread
over a large area.
" The section was enacted originally in 1872 when few businesses were conducted over
a large area.
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have been imposed. Thus, an undue advantage will be gained until the matter
is litigated, if, indeed, it is litigated at all.
1 -2
SALES-BREACH OF WARRANTY-RIGHT OF BUYER TO RETAIN PART OF A
TOTALLY DEFECTIVE SHIPMENT OF GOODS UNDER A CONTRACT AND RESCIND
AS TO THE REMAINDER-Under warranty of quality, plaintiff bought yarn of
defendant which, to defendant's knowledge, was to be used for the manufacture
of hats. The yarn arrived wet with dye, preventing plaintiff from discovering
that it was of inferior quality, and plaintiff sent part of it to be manufactured.
Upon delivery of the hats, the yarn was discovered to be defective. Defendant
refused to receive back the unused yarn. Plaintiff claimed the right to rescind as to
this part, and sued to recover a proportionate amount of the consideration paid.
Held, that under § 69 of the Uniform Sales Act, there may be partial rescission
of a divisible contract if the buyer's inability to return all of the goods results
from the fault of the seller. Moskowitz v. Flock, 171 Ati. 400 (Pa. Super.
1934).
At common law, rescission for breach of warranty, after receipt of the
goods, was a right not universally enjoyed by the buyer,' except where the war-
ranty was knowingly false.2 The right, where accorded, was conditioned upon
the buyer's rescinding in toto, on the theory that the seller must be put in statu
quo." Partial rescission, it was thought, would be tantamount to making a new
contract without the necessary mutual assent. 4 The problem of the instant case-
one of first impression in Pennsylvania-is not definitely met by the Uniform
Sales Act. Under § 69, rescission is stated as among the remedies which the
buyer may elect for breach of warranty.5 However, by the weight of authority,
this section is held merely declaratory of the common law rule that the buyer must
rescind in toto.8 The court in the instant case took a contrary view, drawing an
analogy to § 44 of the Act, which provides that if a larger quantity has been de-
livered or if goods of an inferior quality have been mixed with those of the kind
contracted for, the buyer may accept those goods answering to description and
reject the remainder. 7 While the validity of the analogy may be questioned, since
in the instant case the correct quantity was delivered and all the goods were of in-
This objection has even more effect in the employer-employee contracts. The un-
equal bargaining power has been recognized. Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So.
563 (La. App. 1932); Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 21o Wis. 467, 246 N. W. 567
(1933).
'Freyman v. Knecht, 78 Pa. 141 (1875), states the Pennsylvania rule prior to the adop-
tion of the Sales Act. For a collection of decisions in point, see 2 WnICsToN, SALES (2d
ed. 1924) § 6o8a. The English law does not allow rescission for breach of warranty. SALE
OF GooDs ACT § 53, 56 & 57 VIcT. c. 71, § 53 (1894).
2 Johnson v. Harley, 121 Ga. 83, 48 S. E. 685 (19o4) ; Gates v. Bliss, 4,3 Vt. 299 (1871);
see Owens v. Sturges, 67 Ill. 366 (1873) ; Freyman v. Knecht, supra note I.
'Continental Jewelry Co. v. Pugh, 168 Ala. 295, 53 So. 324 (191o) ; Maynard v. Render,
95 Ga. 652, 23 S. E. 194 (1894) ; see Buchenau v. Homey, 12 Ill. 336 (185o) ; Snow v. Alley,
i44 Mass. 546, 11 N. E. 764 (1887). Contra: Wilson v. Solberg, 145 Wis. 573, 13o N. W.
472 (1911). See Note (1912) 22 ANN. CAs. 66o.
'See 2 BLACK, REscISSION AND CANCELLATION (2d ed. 1929) § 583.
UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 69, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 69, § 314. For breach
of warranty the buyer may, at his election, (a) recover by way of recoupment; (b) sue for
damages; or (c) rescind the contract.
I Santa Rosa etc. Co. v. Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App. 236 (1923) ; McClarran v. Long-
din-Brugger Co., 24 Ohio App. 434, 157 N. E. 828 (1926) ; see Learned v. Hamburger, 245
Mass. 461, 471, 139 N. E. 641, 644 (1923).
7 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 44, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 69, § 254.
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ferior quality," it is submitted that the result reached is a desirable one.0 On sim-
ilar facts, this result has been attained on the theory that § 69 does not proldbit
partial rescission.10 The impelling reason for the rule adopted in the instant case
was that the buyer's inability to return all the goods received was "attributable to
the fault of the seller".'1 Presumably this fault lay in the seller's knowledge that
the buyer lacked reasonable opportunity to discover the breach until the goods
were partially manufactured.' 2  The court would have enhanced appreciably the
value of its decision had it indicated specifically the nature or degree of fault
which gives rise to the right of partial rescission.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-PRIVILEGE OF PRIVATE AMBULANCE
TO ENTER "THRu" STREET WITHOUT STPPING--Private ambulance, answering
emergency call, entered a "Thru" street without stopping, as required by statute,'
and collided with defendant's truck. In an action to recover for damage to the
ambulance, plaintiff relied on statutes exempting ambulances from speed limit
restrictions 2 and granting them the right of way while on "official" business.3
Held, that despite these latter statutes, plaintiff's failure to stop rendered him
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Buck v. Ice Delivery Co.,
29 P. (2d) 523 (Ore. 1934).
Although courts have unanimously granted to fire vehicles special privileges,4
many decisions have refused to extend this policy to ambulances, and have strictly
construed statutory exemptions, applying them no further than their literal mean-
ing would permit.' In the instant case, however, the question of statutory con-
struction was so moot that the" court might have decided it either way with equal
plausibility." In deciding as it did, the court seems to have been moved by the
'Moreover, the right to accept in part, provided for by this section of the Act, must be
distinguished from the right to rescind in part after the goods have been received. See Port-
folio v. Rubin, 233 N. Y. 439, 135 N. E. 843 (1922), (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 988; Pratz v.
Fischer & Co., 244 Mass. 6, 137 N. E. 749 (923).
' Since the basis of the remedy is that the buyer has not received what he bargained for,
its desirability would seem to be purely a matter of fair business dealing. See WLISTON, op.
cit. supra note I, §§ 6o8, 6Io.
" Clifford v. Stewart, 153 Minn. 382, 19o N. W. 613 (1922) ; Fiterman v. Johnson & Co.,
156 Minn. 201, 194 N. W. 399 (923).
n In support of this rule the court relied upon § 69 (3) of the Sales Act and CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT (Aim. L. Inst. 1932) § 4oo (i) (a), whereby return of the property "in sub-
stantially as good condition as received" is excused if deterioration has been brought about
by the seller's failure to comply with the contract or the order under which the property was
delivered.
' As in Clifford v. Stewart, supra note I0, where the seller knew that the goods were in-
tended for consumption as food, or as in Fiterman v. Johnson & Co., szapra note io, where he
knew that they were to be resold by the buyer, and that the buyer would not discover the
breach until they were partially consumed or resold.
OMn. CODE ANN. (1930) § 55-704.
'Id. at § 55-1007 (d).Id. at § 55-605.
'Bathasar v. Pacific Electric Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 202 Pac. 37 (92 ) ; Devine v. City of
Chicago, 172 Ill. App. 246 (1912) ; City of Kansas v. McDonald, 6o Kan. 481, 57 Pac. 123
(1899) ; Benefiel v. Eagle Brass Foundry, 154 Wash. 330, 282 Pac. 213 (1929).
rWest v. Jaloff, 113 Ore. 184, 232 Pac. 642 (925).
aIn the instant case, there was a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion, each taking
a different view of the statutory question. Other cases, too, have displayed the same uncer-
tainty. Thus, where an ambulance driver failed to stop at a "red light" at an intersection,
Lamar & Smith v. Stroud, 5 S. W. (2d) 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), held him negligent; but
Leete v. Griswold Post, 114 Conn. 400, 158 Atl. 99 (1932), held him non-negligent. The
court in the instant case attempted to distinguish the latter case on the ground that there a
statute required all other vehicles to stop upon hearing the siren of an emergency vehicle.
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consideration that the risk of collision involved in entering a heavily traveled
"Thru" street, whose traffic, relying on the right of way at all intersections, moves
rapidly, might far outweigh the benefit to be gained by reaching a hospital
quickly.7  But though this reasoning is undeniably sound where a non-negligent
plaintiff sues an ambulance owner for damages, it loses much force where, as in
the instant case, the ambulance owner sues another person who, admittedly, has
been negligent. It may be true that the chance of saving a human life by rushing
to a hospital is insufficient to justify the injuring of careful persons; but it should
not follow from this that it is insufficient to prevent a negligent defendant from
setting up the shield of contributory negligence.8 A further ground on which
the decision in the instant case might rest is that there is no public policy to justify
the granting of special privileges to private ambulance owners, who drive for
their private profit. The distinction between private and public ambulances has
been emphasized by a few courts in construing statutes granting to ambulances
the right of way while on "official" business, their theory being that this latter
term must mean business engaged in by a publicly owned vehicle. On principle,
however, this distinction is invalid. If the fundamental reason for permitting
public ambulances to subject others to extraordinary risk is the possibility of
saving a human life,10 then it would seem to be equally applicable to privately
owned ambulances.
TORTS-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION-LIABILITY OF ABSTRAcTER OF
TITLE FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION TO ONE NOT IN P1RITY-X, by an
agent, ordered an abstract of title from defendant, defendant knowing it was for
X, but not knowing that X was bound under an option agreement with Y to fur-
nish an abstract to Y. The land was desired by Y for a service station. By
defendant's negligence a restriction in the title forbidding the use of the land for
this purpose was not shown by the abstract. Y assigned the option to plaintiff
who desired the land for the same purpose. Plaintiff, in reliance upon the ab-
stract, purchased the land, but was restrained from erecting a service station
thereon and sued to recover damages resulting from defendant's negligence.
Held, that plaintiff could not recover, because an abstracter's liability for negli-
gent misrepresentation sounds in contract and not in tort, and only those in privity
with him have a right of action.' Phoenix T. & T. Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,
29 P. (2d) io65 (Ariz. 1934).
Instant case, pp. 523, 524.
8 But in no case involving this problem has this distinction been suggested. Yet the doc-
trine that contributory negligence should under all circumstances completely bar a plaintiff
from recovery has been criticized on the ground that its harshness finds no justification in
principle or utility. Smith, Shodd the Contributory Negligence Rule Be Ameliorated?
(927) I CALIF. ST. BAR J. 246; McMurchy, Contributory Negligence--.Should the Ride in
Admiralty and the Civil Law Be Adopted? (1923) 1 CAN. BAR. REV. 844, 856; Bohlen, Con.
tributory Negligence (i9o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 233.
'Asher & Son v. Warner Co., lo3 Pa. Super. 569, 158 Atl. 292 (1931) ; concurring opin-
ion in instant case, at 527.
0 No other reason has been anywhere suggested. Cases granting privileges to fire and
police vehicles also find their justification in the fact that the drivers of these vehicles could
not perform their public service if they should be bound by the ordinary rules of caution.
City of Kansas v. McDonald, supra note 4; Edberg v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 395, 184 N. W. 12
(1921); Hanlon v. Milwaukee Electric Ry., 118 Wis. 210, 95 N. W. IOO (19o3).
' Certain exceptions as follows are noted in the opinion: (I) Where the abstracter is by
statute required to file a bond for the benefit of persons injured by erroneous statements in
the abstract; (2) where the abstract is ordered by the agent of an undisclosed principal;
(3) where the original abstract is reissued to the third party; (4) where the abstract is made
for a third party beneficiary. Principal case at lo68.
RECENT CASES
By the great weight of authority, in the absence of fraud, one who makes a
certificate or report or gives information under contract, incurs liability for incor-
rect statements resulting from carelessness to only those in privity.2 Liability
for negligent words has been recognized, however, where the person giving the
information knew the identity of the party to whom the information was to be
given and knew that the latter intended to rely thereon ; where the defendant
gave the information in the course of his activity in a "public calling" ;4 or where
the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary.5 Beyond this the courts have not, in
the main, been willing explicitly to go. The reason for their reluctance lies in
their fear of imposing too sweeping a liability and thus hindering business
activity.6 However, the fact that the courts have actually, if not ostensibly,
long given recovery for harm resulting from negligent words,
7 and their
occasional willingness to strain the law of contract to allow the plaintiff to re-
cover as a third party beneficiary suggests that they realize the necessity
under modern business conditions of imposing liability for misstatement to a
greater extent than is permitted by the privity of contract doctrine or the tra-
ditional deceit formula. The difficulty lies in deciding the limits of such liability.
Professor Williston's suggestion that absolute warranty liability be imposed"
is objectionable on the ground of its stringency and the confusion already extant
in the law of warranty." The third party beneficiary theory is too often, in its
application to particular facts, a distortion of contract law.10 The traditional
scienter doctrine of the action of deceit is unsuitable because of its inflexibility
and of the difficulties of proof it offers." No sufficiently pliant formula so
adequately meets the increasing necessity, in the speed and complexity of modern
business, for reliance upon the accuracy of informative statements as does the
negligence formula.1 2  In this view of the matter, the question of liability in
situations like that of the instant case is for the jury by the application of the
ordinary negligence test of foreseeability.13
2 Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 67.
'Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896 (i8go) ; Anderson v.
Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912) ; cf. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931).
'Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
" Economy Bldg. Ass'n v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J. L. 27, 44 Atl. 854 (1899) ; see
Glanzer v. Shepard, sipra note 4, at 241, 235 N. E. at 277.
' Ultramares v. Touche, supra note 3.
'See Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (igoo) 14 HARV. L. REv. 184, at i9r. The
cases there cited in fact impose liability for negligent words although they do so under the
guise of "presumptions of knowledge" or "implied representations of knowledge" and thus
preserve the traditional scienter formula (recovery when they were decided being limited to
the action on the case for deceit or for breach of a contract duty), even though scienter there
may have been none. The objections to this method of treating the problem have been ably
pointed out. Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARV.
L. REv. 733.
8 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (IgII) 24 HARv. L. REv. 425, 438.
'Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation
(1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 749, at 760.
See cases cited supra note 5. Frequently no intent by the contracting parties to give
the plaintiff a right of action on the contract can be found. See Murphy v. Fidelity Abstract
Co., 114 Wash. 77, 194 Pac. 591 (921).
n' But to the effect that the scienter doctrine is the most suitable formula because of its
flexibility in actual practice, see Green, Deceit (293o) 16 VA. L. REv. 749.
" Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 866, at 874.
' Cole v. Vincent, 229 App. Div. 520, 246 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1930). Such a rule does
not necessarily impose liability on the abstracter, and it permits a greater freedom of de-
cision with particular reference to the facts of each case than does a general rule of law con-
ditioned by the ideology of the period in which it is born and developing too slowly to meet
ever-changing times.
